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LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE:  
THE CASE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
Francis X. Shen 
        
           Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being introduced in 
legal contexts, and neurolaw scholarship is correspondingly on the rise. 
Yet absent from neurolaw research to date are extended examinations 
of neuroscience in legislative domains. This Article begins to fill that 
gap with a focus on the illustrative case of neuroscience and juvenile 
justice in state legislatures. Such examination reveals distinctions 
between lab neuroscience, lobbyist neuroscience, and legislator 
neuroscience. As neuroscience narratives are constructed in the policy 
stream, normative questions arise. Without courtroom evidentiary rules 
to guide the use of neuroscience in legislatures, these questions are 
complicated. For instance, to what extent should lobbyists and 
legislators adhere to the complexities and caveats of laboratory 
science? How much should lawmakers simplify and reformulate the 
scientific findings to achieve desired policy ends? 
          The Article argues that the construction of neuroscience 
narratives is necessary and desirable, but if the narratives diverge too 
greatly from actual research findings, they may ultimately undermine 
the efficacy of the neuroscience in policymaking. 
 
 
  McKnight Land-Grant Professor & Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota. Executive Director of Education & Outreach, MacArthur Foundation Research 
Network on Law and Neuroscience. Contact: Walter F. Mondale Hall, 229-19th Avenue South, 
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LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE 9/9/2014  11:46 AM 
986 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:985 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 987 
II.  ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE & THE COURTS ............................ 989 
A.  The Rise of Neurolaw ...................................................... 989 
B.  Neurolaw and Juvenile Justice ......................................... 992 
III.  BRAIN SCIENCE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN STATE 
LEGISLATURES ....................................................................... 996 
A.  Advocating With Brain Science ...................................... 997 
B.  How Neuroscience Has Already Influenced Juvenile 
Justice Policy ................................................................ 1000 
C.  Unknown Effect of Neuroscience on Policy Outcomes 1005 
IV.  LEGISLATING BRAIN SCIENCE POST-MILLER ........................... 1006 
A.  Legislation Post-Miller .................................................. 1007 
V.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 1018 
 
LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE 9/9/2014  11:46 AM 
Spring 2013] LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE 987 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court juvenile justice cases examined in this 
symposium issue—Miller v. Alabama,1 Graham v. Florida,2 and 
Roper v. Simmons3—are notable both for their substantive holdings, 
and for the neuroscience research findings that appear in many of the 
amici briefs and some of the opinions.4 My goal in this Article is to 
add to that conversation by suggesting that our attention—both for 
purposes of understanding the future of juvenile justice policy, and 
for understanding how neuroscience may play a role in shaping that 
future—should be placed on the legislative as well as the judicial 
branch.  
Why examine legislative use of neuroscience? Supreme Court 
Justice Elena Kagan provides us with an answer. During a  
question-and-answer session in 2012 Justice Kagan was asked about 
her opinion on juvenile transfer policies, and she replied: “[T]hat’s 
for a legislature to do . . . . [W]hat makes for good criminal justice 
policy[?] . . . I view that as a very different question than the 
questions that I’m answering and a different role to be performed 
than the role I have.”5 Justice Kagan reminds us that as important as 
Miller, Graham, and Roper are for setting limits on legislative 
action, much of detailed policymaking for juvenile justice remains in 
the domain of legislators, not judges. It is thus important that we 
investigate how these individuals are legislating neuroscience. 
How legislators use or ignore scientific evidence has been 
explored in domains such as environmental policymaking.6 But such 
inquiries have not been made in the context of neuroscience, and we 
have an underdeveloped sense of how neuroscience is used by 
legislatures. In addition, we lack an accepted normative framework 
by which we should evaluate that use of neuroscience. Unlike 
courtroom use, where we can employ evidentiary standards such as 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 4. For an excellent summary of these cases in historical perspective, see Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535 
(2013); Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 
11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71 (2013). 
 5. Elena Kagan, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Remarks at the University of Richmond 
School of Law (Sept. 20, 2012) (emphasis added). 
 6. See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
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those in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,7 in legislatures there are few restrictions on what 
can be considered as part of the policymaking process. Indeed, it is 
often a high-profile focusing event, not a body of scientific research, 
that spurs policymakers into action. 
Using the illustrative case of juvenile justice and focusing on 
state legislatures, this Article begins to explore how neuroscience is 
being used in the statehouse. I find that juvenile justice policy 
discussion in state legislatures includes mention of adolescent brain 
science. It is unclear what effect this science has on policymaking, 
but brain science is being presented at legislative hearings, cited by 
legislators, and integrated into some new laws. I also find, however, 
that how neuroscience is discussed by advocates in the policy stream 
differs, in important ways, from what the science itself says. Legal 
advocates seem to be more aggressive and categorical in their use of 
the science, presumably because they find this more persuasive to 
achieve their desired ends. 
I argue that we need to carefully consider the framework by 
which we evaluate such “neuroscience narratives.” If the science 
narrative used in legislatures achieves a socially desirable outcome, 
is it a “mis-use” of the science, to be criticized? Or is it a good use of 
the science, to be encouraged? To what extent should the juvenile 
justice policy arguments in legislatures rely upon brain science? In 
answering such questions, I suggest that we ought to keep in mind 
the possibility that, should neuroscience make sufficient progress in 
assessing individual differences among juveniles, the present 
alignment of neuroscience research with juvenile justice reformers 
may be strained.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the recent 
rise of law and neuroscience, and reviews literature on the 
intersection of brain science and juvenile justice. Part II examines 
how legislatures, and the advocacy groups lobbying those 
legislatures, have incorporated brain science in their deliberations. 
Part III shifts focus specifically to post-Miller legislative activity, 
with a brief discussion of how brain science is playing a role. Part IV 
considers more broadly how we ought to understand, and critique, 
neuroscience in the legislature. Part V concludes. 
 
7.  509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
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II.  ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE & THE COURTS 
A.  The Rise of Neurolaw8 
Neuroscience is being integrated into U.S. law and policy in a 
variety of ways.9 Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly, if still 
rarely, seen in courtrooms.10 Two juvenile public defenders in 
Virginia report that they use brain science “all the time on a variety 
of issues—transfer/certification, correctional versus non-correctional 
sentences, Miranda, accomplice liability, applicability of adult 
sentencing guidelines . . . . Basically, we try to work it in whenever 
we can.”11 Brain science can also be disseminated in more subtle 
ways. For instance, in the Minnesota Department of Public Safety’s 
summary guide of juvenile diversion programs, there is an explicit 
connection made between adolescent brain science and the efficacy 
of diversion.12 
Other indicators also suggest growth: scholarship at the 
intersection of law and neuroscience is growing rapidly,13 an 
 
 8. This subsection is based on a similar subsection in Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, 
Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 653, 660–664 (2013). 
 9. For lengthier and more comprehensive introductions to neurolaw, see BRENT GARLAND, 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (2004); Owen D. 
Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL 
NEUROLAW (Tade Spranger ed., 2011); LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 
(Michael Freeman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010); LAW, MIND AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman & 
Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009); Preface, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2012); NEUROIMAGING IN 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012); 
Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007); Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: 
Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1119 (2010); Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61 (2010); Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, 
Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed. 
2011); Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for 
Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007). 
 10. See Jones & Shen, supra note 9, at 3504. 
 11. H. Ted Rubin, The Legal Defense of Juveniles: Struggling but Pushing Forward, 16 JUV. 
JUST. UPDATE, June/July 2010, at 2. 
 12. DANA SWAYZE & DANETTE BUSKOVICK, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA 
JUVENILE DIVERSION: A SUMMARY OF STATEWIDE PRACTICES AND PROGRAMMING 50 (2012) 
(“Adolescent brain development research shows that the portions of the brain that govern 
reasoning and comprehending consequences are not fully developed in youth. As such, diversion 
opportunities for youth are especially important given diminished reasoning capacity . . . .”). 
 13. Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging 
Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 352 (2010). 
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increasing number of students are being introduced to neurolaw,14 
the first Law and Neuroscience textbook is being published,15 
thousands of judges and lawyers are being exposed to neuroscience 
through conferences and continuing legal education programs,16 and 
multiple web sites are making neurolaw news available to the 
interested public.17 
Moreover, and of note, this area of research has seen 
investments from foundations and government agencies.18 For 
instance, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation 
invested $10 million in 2007 to start a Law and Neuroscience 
Project,19 and in 2011 the Foundation renewed its commitment with 
a $4.85 million dollar grant to sustain the Research Network on Law 
and Neuroscience.20 These institutional commitments foster dialogue 
and research, and send a strong signal that this is a field of great 
possibility. 
While some have predicted that neuroscience will fundamentally 
change the law,21 there has been push-back to this claim.22 The field 
has debated issues regarding criminal responsibility;23 free will;24 
 
 14. OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 
(2014). 
 15. Id. 
 16. History: Phase I (2007–2011), MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L. & 
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/history.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 17. External Links, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L. & NEUROSCIENCE, 
http://www.lawneuro.org/links.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 18. See JONES, SCHALL & SHEN, supra note 14. 
 19. New $10 Million MacArthur Project Integrates Law and Neuroscience, MACARTHUR 
FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.macfound.org/press/press-releases/new-10-million-macarthur 
-project-integrates-law-and-neuroscience. 
 20. Law and Neuroscience Network Expands at Vanderbilt, MACARTHUR FOUND. 
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.macfound.org/press/press-releases/law-and-neuroscience-network-
expands-at-vanderbilt; Amy Wolf, Landmark Law and Neuroscience Network Expands at 
Vanderbilt, VANDERBILT UNIV. (Aug. 24, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2011/08 
/grant-will-expand-law-neuroscience-network/. 
 21. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 1775 (2004). 
 22. E.g., Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for 
Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837 (2011) [hereinafter Morse, Avoiding Irrational 
NeuroLaw Exuberance]; Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal 
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006) [hereinafter Morse, Brain 
Overclaim]; Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and 
Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1250 (2010).   
 23. See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1787 (2004). Legal scholar and psychologist Stephen 
J. Morse argues that to conflate explanation with excuse is to commit a “fundamental psycholegal 
error.” Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future of Personhood and Responsibility, in 
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neuroethics;25 and many areas beyond criminal law.26 Legal scholar 
Jennifer Drobac has argued, in part based on new neuroscience 
findings, that the law ought to better empower teenagers in some 
civil contexts.27 Similarly, legal scholars have explored ways in 
which neuroscience can inform the legal regimes governing 
adolescent medical decision making.28 
Although attorneys do not routinely use brain-based evidence in 
a large number of legal contexts, attorneys are using such evidence 
more than they have in previous years. Structural brain imaging is a 
standard part of an assessment of an individual known to have 
experienced a traumatic brain injury (TBI).29 Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET) and Single-Photon Emission Computed 
Tomography (SPECT) have been used in a variety of criminal and 
civil cases.30 
 
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 113, 120 (Jeffrey Rosen & 
Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) [hereinafter Morse, Neuroscience]; Morse, Avoiding Irrational 
NeuroLaw Exuberance, supra note 22, at 846; Morse, Brain Overclaim, supra note 22, at 399; 
see Greene & Cohen, supra note 21, at 1778; David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, 308 THE 
ATLANTIC 112 (2011); see, e.g., DEBORAH W. DENNO, CHANGING LAW’S MIND: HOW 
NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP US PUNISH CRIMINALS MORE FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2011); Nita Farahany & Hank Greely, Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal 
Responsibility, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 183 (Nita 
Farahany ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009); Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help 
Courts Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 145 (2008); Shelley Batts, Brain Lesions and Their Implications in Criminal 
Responsibility, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261 (2009); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Neuropsychology of 
Justifications and Excuses: Some Problematic Cases of Self-Defense, Duress, and Provocation, 
50 JURIMETRICS J. 391 (2010). 
 24. CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET (Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
 25. OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS (Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian eds., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2011). 
 26. See Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal 
and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, 
MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114 (Dana Found. & Brent Garland eds., 2004); Adam J. 
Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011). 
 27. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers, and 
the Sting to “The Age of Consent”, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 115 (2011). 
 28. Amanda C. Pustilnik & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Introduction: Adolescent Medical 
Decision Making and the Law of the Horse, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2012) 
(“Neuroscience can inform legal regimes relating to adolescent decision making, although it 
cannot fully explain them, by substantiating and verifying, or negating, the ideas of difference on 
which such policies currently rest.”). 
 29. Robert P. Granacher, Jr., Traumatic Brain Injury, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC 
PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 43, 44 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012). 
Functional imaging in traumatic brain injury cases is less common. Id. at 57. 
 30. Susan E. Rushing et al., PET and SPECT, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: 
FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM, supra note 29, 3, 20–21. 
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The effect of neuroscience on judicial and juror decision making 
remains unknown. One view is that the “seductive allure” of 
neuroscientific explanations, and in particular the allure of colorful 
brain images, will be unduly persuasive.31 One experimental study 
using state court judges as subjects concluded (in a non-adolescent 
context) that judges significantly reduced their sentences for 
psychopaths when provided with a neuroscientific explanation for 
the psychopath’s behavior.32 But other experimental studies have 
found null effects.33 Meanwhile, other reported data suggests that the 
impact of neuroscience in courts has been minimal, with some now 
warning about the seductive allure of the seductive allure 
explanation.34 In short, while it is clear that the use of neuroscientific 
evidence is on the rise, we cannot say with confidence what the 
actual effects of such evidence will be. 
B.  Neurolaw and Juvenile Justice 
Courts, practitioners, and scholars have observed the potential 
implications of neuroscience for juvenile justice.35 The standard 
 
 31.  Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcu, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain Injury on 
Insanity Defense, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85, 85–97 (2008); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The 
Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470–77 
(2008). 
 31. Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or 
Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337 SCIENCE 846, 846 (2012). 
 32. Id. 
 33. N. J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, 17 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 382 (2011); Michael J. Saks et al., The Impact of Neuroimages 
in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 11 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (2014). 
 34. Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice, in 13 LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 258, supra note 9, 255, 269 (“Though the science has 
been positively received by a small number of courts and judges, usually in the context of 
sentencing, in no instance has it been outcome-determinative.”); Martha J. Farah & Cayce J. 
Hook, The Seductive Allure of “Seductive Allure”, 8 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 88 (2013). 
 35. See Katherine H. Federle & Paul Skendelas, Thinking Like a Child: Legal Implications 
of Recent Developments in Brain Research for Juvenile Offenders, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 
199 (Ashgate et al. eds., 2009); Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115 (2007); Abigail A. Baird et al., Juvenile 
Neurolaw: When It’s Good It Is Very Good Indeed, and When It’s Bad It’s Horrid, 15 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 15 (2012); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and 
the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Terry A. Maroney, 
Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2010) 
[hereinafter Maroney, After Graham]; Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain 
Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009) [hereinafter Maroney, The False 
Promise]. This Article focuses only on the criminal justice implications of brain science in the 
legislature. As others have recognized and discussed, developmental neuroscience may also have 
implications for the demarcation of children’s rights. See Catherine J. Ross, A Stable Paradigm: 
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logic of most of these arguments typically is consistent with Justice 
Kagan’s discussion in Miller: 
Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on what 
“any parent knows”—but on science and social science as 
well . . . . [I]n Graham, we noted that “developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds”—for 
example, in “parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control.” We reasoned that those findings—of transient 
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess 
consequences—both lessened a child’s “moral culpability” 
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and 
neurological development occurs, his “deficiencies will be 
reformed.”36 
Most legal commentators have been supporters of this trend 
toward the integration of neuroscience into legal and policy decision 
making. Law professor Terry Maroney has tracked the contours of 
these developments in a series of articles, summarizing the history 
this way: 
Scholars and advocates in the late 1990s . . . correctly 
perceived that science and law were moving in opposite 
directions: the former was solidifying around the view that 
adolescents are different from adults in ways directly 
relevant to their culpability and capacity for change, while 
the latter was solidifying around the view that adolescents, 
particularly older ones or those accused of very serious 
crimes, ought to be treated like adults.37 
Many commentators now believe that “[t]he research in brain 
development has wide-ranging implications for juvenile 
offenders . . . [and] raises questions about current concepts of 
culpability, accountability and punishment, . . . transferring or 
 
Revisiting Capacity, Vulnerability and the Rights Claims of Adolescents After Roper v. Simmons, 
in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 183, 189–196 (Ashgate et al. eds., 2009). Developmental neuroscience 
has also played a role in legislative debate over early child intervention. H.R. 2794, 112th Cong. 
§ 4 (1) (2011) (noting in congressional findings that “research conclusively shows that children’s 
experiences in the early years of life influence the developing brain and have a significant and 
lasting impact upon their ability to succeed in school and in life”). 
 36. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 37. Maroney, supra note 34, at 258. 
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relinquishing jurisdiction to adult courts, and labelling [sic] minors 
as sexual offenders or predators.”38 
For instance, Katherine Hunt Federle and Paul Skendelas 
suggest that such evidence “provides a neural basis for assuming that 
teens are less blameworthy than adults for the commission of 
criminal acts.”39 Later they write that “[t]he brain research provides 
strong evidence that we should not hold minors as accountable as 
adults because their brains are different and they do not have the 
same decision-making capacity as adults.”40 And finally, the authors 
suggest that “[t]he scientific research on brain development is 
sufficiently compelling as to require us to reconsider our views on 
juvenile punishment as it is morally wrong and scientifically 
unsound to hold juveniles to the same degree of responsibility as 
adults who commit similar offenses.”41 
To be sure, scholars are not uniformly in support of these 
positions. While many scientists and clinicians are in agreement, and 
some are active in juvenile justice reform,42 not all share this 
sentiment.43 On the law side, a prolific critic has been law professor 
Stephen Morse.44 Morse has argued that “[t]he neuroscience 
evidence in no way independently confirms that adolescents are less 
responsible” than adults.45 Even if one assumes that the 
 
 38. Federle & Skendelas, supra note 35, at 199. 
 39. Id. at 202 (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 213. 
 41. Id. at 213–14. 
 42. H.B. 1994 and Juvenile Justice: Hearing Before the H. Democratic Policy Comm., 2012 
Leg. 33–42 (Pa. 2012), available at www.pahouse.com/PolicyCommittee/documents/2012 
/hdpc081512.pdf  (exhibit in support of a statement by Rev. Dr. Roger L. Thomas, Co-Chair of 
the Governor’s Pa. Comm. for the Analysis and Reform of Our Criminal Sys.). 
 43. Robert Epstein, The Myth of the Teen Brain, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND, Apr. 2007,  
57–63. Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917, 928 (2009) 
(“[T]here is nothing even approaching consensus within the scientific community that these brain 
imaging studies ought to guide legal decision-making and public policy in the context of juvenile 
justice.”). 
 44. See Morse, Neuroscience, supra note 23, at 120; Morse, Avoiding Irrational Neurolaw 
Exuberance, supra note 22, at 837; Morse, Brain Overclaim, supra note 22, at 399. Stephen J. 
Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome Redux: More Cognitive Jurotherapy Is Indicated, 31 LAW & 
INEQ. 509 (2013). Others have similarly recognized that the future of neuroscience and law is not 
necessarily a bright one. Abigail A. Baird et al., supra note 35, at 34 (“If used properly and 
interpreted accurately, neuroscientific data could aid the courts just as much as data from DNA 
methodologies have. However, if professionals misuse, grossly misinterpret or ‘stretch’ the 
meaning of the data, neuroscience will end up sharing its history with eugenics.”). 
 45. Stephen J. Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neuroscience, in 
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33, 48 (Judy Illes ed., 
2005). 
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neuroscientific data is valid, Morse suggests that the “neuroscience 
evidence in no way independently confirms the adolescents are less 
responsible.”46 In the context of juvenile justice, the message is that 
even if the Court cited neuroscience studies, neuroscience is not 
nearly as threatening or as transformative as some make it out to 
be.47 In addition, there are a tremendous number of limitations and 
cautions with current brain science techniques that must be 
acknowledged.48 
Similarly, legal scholar Emily Buss argues that “there is nothing 
inherent about an adolescent’s blameworthiness however well we 
understand the progress of their development, and it is up to the law, 
not developmental science, to assign that blame.”49 When authors or 
advocates suggest that neuroscience shows adolescents are less 
blameworthy, this “improperly suggests that adolescents’ 
developmental status dictates their level of culpability and leaves no 
room for independent legal (or moral) judgment.”50 
Particularly challenging is that current science tells us reliably 
about group average differences in brain development in age, but 
cannot reliably tell us about the individual cognitive ability of a 
particular juvenile in the criminal justice system.51 Neuroscience is 
thus potentially informative—but still very much limited in what it 
can presently offer to improve the adjudication of juvenile criminal 
cases.52 But do limitations to courtroom use of neuroscience apply 
 
 46. Id.; see also Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, 
in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES: LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 9, 529, 562 (“Neuroscience 
has the potential to make internal contributions to legal doctrine and practice if the relation is 
properly understood. For now, however, such contributions are modest at best and neuroscience 
poses no genuine, radical challenges to concepts of personhood, responsibility, and 
competence.”). 
 47. See Aharoni et al., supra note 23, at 156–59. 
 48. See Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 9, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brain-
imaging.pdf; see, e.g., Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with 
fMRI, 453 NATURE 869, 876 (2008). 
 49. Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and Juvenile 
Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 510 (2009). 
 50. Id. 
      51. For a discussion of the group to individual inference problem, see David L. Faigman et 
al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 
(2014). 
 52. Many others have similarly recognized the need for caution in light of these limitations. 
Jay Aronson, for instance, has observed that “[w]hile it is indeed possible that teens who commit 
crimes are on average biologically different from those who do not, the current state of 
neuroscience . . . leaves us in no position to make a claim one way or the other” and thus 
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equally to legislative use of neuroscience? I spend the remainder of 
the Article exploring this question, looking first at how brain science 
is so far been used in state legislatures. 
III.  BRAIN SCIENCE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN STATE LEGISLATURES 
This part explores how brain science has been used in the 
development of juvenile justice legislation.53 I suggest that brain 
science is a part of the juvenile justice policy dialogue, but it is 
primarily a part of one side of that dialogue—the side that argues for 
lower mandatory sentences and against juvenile transfer to adult 
courts. In addition, I suggest that the rhetoric used by advocacy 
groups is more categorical than the measured approach suggested by 
the underlying research. 
Legislative activity in the arena of juvenile justice was well 
underway before the Supreme Court’s recent string of decisions 
involving brain science.54 As historians of juvenile justice in 
America have noted, it was legislative activity (influenced in various 
and interrelated ways by citizen opinion, legal developments, and 
media coverage) that led to the juvenile justice system that reformers 
now seek to change.55 Legislative action since 2001 shows the 
effects of current reformers’ efforts.56 
 
“neuroscience does not (at least at present) offer a way out of the vexing problems at the heart of 
juvenile justice.” Aronson, supra note 43, at 930; see also Aronson, supra note 35, at 134 (“[T]he 
actual usefulness of brain imaging in the legal system is the subject of much debate.”). 
 53. This part focuses on state legislatures, but the U.S. Congress has also considered 
neuroscience evidence when deliberating about juvenile justice. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act: Overview and Perspectives: Before the Healthy Family & Cmtys. 
Subcomm., U.S. H.R. Educ. & Labor Comm., and the Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec. 
Subcomm., and the U.S. H.R. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 25 (2007) (testimony of Hon. Paul 
Lawrence, Goffstown Dist. Court, N.H. State Juvenile Justice Advisory Grp.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/36466.pdf. 
 54. Indicative of the importance of legislation for juvenile justice, the MacArthur 
Foundation funded a program to allow the National Conference of State Legislatures to track 
legislative activity. See Juvenile Justice Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/justice/ncsls-juvenile-justice-bill-tracking-database.aspx (last 
updated Dec. 18, 2012); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 154–227 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001) (describing the history of juvenile 
justice in America). 
 55. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); ELIZABETH SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT 
RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (2011). 
 56. SARAH ALICE BROWN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, TRENDS IN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION 2001–2011, at 6 (2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org 
/documents/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf. 
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While courts may have drawn the bulk of scholarly neurolaw 
attention, “[l]egislatures are recognizing the importance of the 
adolescent brain development research as well.”57 This part proceeds 
by reviewing some of the advocacy efforts for legislating brain 
science in juvenile justice, and some of the legislative activity 
undertaken as a result.58 
A.  Advocating With Brain Science 
Studies of legislative behavior show that interest group activity 
plays a key role in determining which issues get on the legislative 
agenda and how policy is crafted in those issue areas.59 In the context 
of criminal justice, research suggests that interest groups play an 
important role.60 
Before examining legislation, therefore, it is useful to review 
how some prominent interest groups are using brain science in their 
advocacy for juvenile justice reform. Advocacy groups make bold 
claims about the relationship between brain science and legal 
reform.61 Indeed, one scholar suggests that “almost all of the major 
liberal and progressive juvenile justice reform organizations in the 
United States have position papers or websites devoted to the use and 
effectiveness of ‘brain science’ in juvenile justice reform.”62 
The National Juvenile Justice Network (NJJN) has developed a 
comprehensive guide for advocates interested in using brain 
 
 57. Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 483, 495 (2009). 
 58. The term “result” is used here casually, not causally, as the evidence presented here does 
not permit one to draw a causal link between the use of brain science by the advocacy groups and 
the resulting legislation. Moreover, the evidence offered here is intended to be illustrative, not 
comprehensive. For additional discussion of whether the use of brain science is effective in 
bringing about the reforms intended by the advocates who use it, see Alexandra Cox, Brain 
Science and Juvenile Justice: Questions for Policy and Practice, in JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SOURCEBOOK 123 (Wesley T. Church II et al. eds., 2013). 
 59. Clive S. Thomas & Ronald J. Hrebenar, Interest Groups in the States, in POLITICS IN 
THE AMERICAN STATES 100, 113–14 (Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson eds., CQ Press 8th ed. 
2004). 
 60. LISA MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS OF 
CRIME CONTROL (2008); Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to 
Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 410 
(2011) (“Advocates for juvenile justice have worked for years to enact legislative change at the 
state level . . . .”). 
 61. Part IV argues that such claims are problematic because they fail to properly address the 
limitations of the science and because they (apparently) fail to see how such a strategy could 
ultimately backfire if the neuroscience of individual differences continues to make rapid progress.  
 62. Cox, supra note 58, at 128. 
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science.63 The guide is unique because it addresses head-on the 
concern that “[m]any researchers argue that . . . there is much more 
that we do not yet know . . . [a]nd thus, it is just too early to start 
using this research to inform policy.”64 The NJJN responds that 
“juvenile justice advocates have found that this research is nothing 
short of compelling” because the brain science “opens the doors to 
legislators’ offices who never before thought about progressive 
juvenile justice reform” and because the science “gives advocates 
and lawyers working on behalf of juveniles scientific proof for their 
claims . . . .”65 In short, NJJN is arguing that the science is good 
enough for persuasive purposes within the political sphere. 
Advocates have used, or promoted the use of, brain science to 
support many arguments over the past few years.66 In 2009, the 
Washington Coalition for the Just Treatment of Youth produced a 
report focused directly on policy implications of neuroscience and 
argued that “[d]evelopments in scientific and psychosocial research 
in recent years suggest that Washington laws that allow for the trial, 
sentencing, and incarceration of youth in the adult system should be 
reexamined.”67 
In Connecticut, the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance 
testified before the Connecticut Judiciary Committee in favor of a 
 
 63. See NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, USING ADOLESCENT BRAIN RESEARCH TO 
INFORM POLICY: A GUIDE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCATES (2012), available at 
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Brain-Development-Policy-Paper_Updated_FINAL-9 
-27-12.pdf. The NJJN “enhances the capacity of juvenile justice coalitions and organizations in 
33 states to press for state and federal laws, policies and practices that are fair, equitable and 
developmentally appropriate for all children, youth and families involved in, or at risk of 
becoming involved in, the justice system.” Our Work, NAT’L JUV. JUST. NETWORK, 
http://www.njjn.org/our-work/our-work (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 64. NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 63, at 3. 
 65. Id. The NJNN also argues that, “perhaps even more importantly, brain development 
research provides heretofore reluctant legislators from ‘tough-on-crime’ districts a basis for a 
shift from punishment of juveniles to rehabilitation.” Id. 
 66. See Cox, supra note 58, at 128 (noting that ”advocates have cited neuroscientific 
research about the adolescent brain to make a case for the lesser punishment of young people 
charged with crimes”); Patricia Soung, Social and Biological Constructions of Youth: 
Implications for Juvenile Justice and Racial Equity, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 428, 433 (2011) 
(“[M]any youth advocates are offering neuroscience, sometimes by itself and sometimes along 
with behavioral and social science, to show that youth are not yet fully formed, cognitively and 
psychosocially, relative to adults.”). 
 67. WASH. COAL. FOR THE JUST TREATMENT OF YOUTH, A REEXAMINATION OF YOUTH 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS OF 
NEW FINDINGS ABOUT JUVENILE RECIDIVISM AND ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 5 
(2009), available at http://www.columbialegal.org/files/JLWOP_cls.pdf. 
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bill that would allow juveniles with life sentences an opportunity for 
parole.68 The Alliance testified that “[s]cience now has proof that a 
teenager’s brain is still developing until the age of 25” and that 
“[b]rain science tells us that children have a greater capacity for 
change than adults.”69 Connecticut Voices for Children made a 
similar point, as it argued that “[t]his information about teenage brain 
development ought to have significant impact on how we view 
young people’s culpability, competency, and potential for 
rehabilitation, and therefore how the courts try and sentence 
juveniles.”70 
The translation of “lab neuroscience” (what the published 
research finds) into “lobbyist neuroscience” (what the lobbyists say 
the research finds) involves a rhetorical reframing of the science.71 
For instance, the Illinois Coalition for the Fair Sentencing of 
Children uses a subheading of “The Hard Science of Culpability” 
when it introduces the connection between brain science and juvenile 
justice reform.72 Act 4 Juvenile Justice similarly suggests that 
“[h]ard science demonstrates that teenagers and young adults are not 
 
 68. In Favor of Raised Bill 417, An Act Concerning Juvenile Matters and Permanent 
Guardianship and H.B. 5546 An Act Concerning Sentence Modification for Juveniles: Before the 
Judiciary Comm., 2012 General Assemb. (Conn. 2012) (testimony of Abby Anderson, Dir. of the 
Conn. Juvenile Justice Alliance), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/JUDdata/Tmy/2012SB 
-00417-R000323-Abby%20Anderson-%20CT%20Juvenile%20Justice%20Alliance%20-
TMY.pdf. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Testimony in Support of H.B. 5546: An Act Concerning Sentence Modification for 
Juveniles; and S.B. 417: An Act Concerning Juvenile Matters and Permanent Guardianship: 
Before the Judiciary Comm., 2012 General Assemb. (Conn. 2012) (testimony on behalf of 
Connecticut Voices for Children), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/JUDdata/Tmy 
/2012HB-05546-R000323-Alexandra%20Dufresne%20&%20Sarah%20Esty%20CT%20Voices 
%20for%20Children-TMY.PDF. 
 71. Terry Maroney recognized the danger of this type of translation:  
The realities of advocacy, in which nuance and complexity are difficult to convey 
without compromising effectiveness, incentivize advocates to oversimplify. . . . It may 
be tempting to regard the frequently flattened or even distorted portrayal of 
neuroscience as harmless if it appears to come “close enough” to the truth for legal, not 
laboratory, purposes. This temptation must be resisted.  
Maroney, supra note 34, at 276–78. 
 72. ILL. COAL. FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF CHILDREN, CATEGORICALLY LESS CULPABLE 
16 (2008) (emphasis added), available at http://webcast-law.uchicago.edu/pdfs/00544_Juvenile 
_Justice_Book_3_10.pdf (“[D]octors have now provided a medical reason for the various 
behaviors identified by psychologists as typical in adolescents: they are not capable of behaving 
like adults because they lack the developed brain structure to do so.”). 
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fully mature in their judgment, problem-solving and decision-making 
capacities.”73 
The brain-behavior relationship is presented as absolute in the 
advocate’s formulation. For example, the National Juvenile Defender 
Center tells juvenile defenders that the “[c]urrent brain development 
research posits that youth are categorically less culpable than the 
average adult offender.”74 
B.  How Neuroscience Has Already Influenced 
Juvenile Justice Policy 
Likely in part due to the advocacy efforts just discussed, state 
legislatures have already considered, and even enacted, a number of 
pieces of juvenile justice that acknowledge brain science.75 This 
section offers a selective review of that legislation, focusing most on 
some developments in New York. 
In California in 2010, State Senator Leland Yee (who holds a 
Ph.D. in child psychology)76 proposed a bill to allow those who were 
convicted before the age of eighteen to life sentences to file a petition 
for a review of their case.77 Although the 2010 efforts ultimately 
 
 73. ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT & JUVENILE JUSTICE 
FACT SHEET (emphasis added), available at http://www.act4jj.org/media/factsheets/factsheet 
_12.pdf. 
 74. ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ROLE OF JUVENILE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 10 (2009) (emphasis added). The report also 
suggests that neuroscience research “has gained wide acceptance, as indicated most recently by 
the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).” Id. There 
are also points at which advocates slightly overstate their claims. For instance, a 2010 report 
submitted to the New York legislature wrote that the science of adolescent brain development is 
“well-grounded enough that it has been accepted both by the Supreme Court which relied heavily 
on adolescent brain development research when ruling the juvenile death penalty 
unconstitutional.” N.Y. STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GRP., TOUGH ON CRIME: 
PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY BY DOING WHAT WORKS 10 (2010), available at  
www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/annualreport/2010-juvenile-justice-annual-report.pdf. In fact, 
the Roper decision itself made no mention of the brain science, and neither Graham nor Miller 
relied heavily on the neuroscience. 
 75. At least one scholar believes that momentum for some of the recent reform in New York 
is based on recent “neurological brain imaging studies proving that the older adolescent’s brain 
has not fully matured,” as well as a “decreas[e] [in] adolescent crime rate.” Merril Sobie, Raising 
the Age: New York’s Archaic Age of Criminal Responsibility, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 6, 2012, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202569840581&Raising_the_Age 
_New_Yorks_Archaic_Age_of_Criminal_Responsibility&slreturn=20120907144817. 
 76. Biography of Senator Leland Yee, CAL. STATE SENATE, http://sd08.senate.ca.gov 
/biography (last visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
 77. Soung, supra note 66, at 428. 
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failed to garner support in both chambers,78 Yee subsequently 
proposed Senate Bill 9, “[t]he Fair Sentencing for Youth Act.”79 This 
bill found more support, and Governor Jerry Brown signed it into 
law in September 2012.80 
In proposing the law in 2011, Senator Yee argued that, among 
other things, California’s existing law “ignore[d] neuroscience and 
well-accepted understandings of adolescent development” and that 
“even those who commit serious crimes should have the opportunity 
to prove they have matured and changed.”81 In promoting the bill, 
Senator Yee argued that “[b]rain maturation continues well through 
adolescence,’” and that the bill thus “‘rightfully provides final 
judgment of youth offenders when they are well into 
adulthood . . . .”82 This translation of neuroscience into policy can be 
seen in other juvenile statutory proposals as well. 
In 2008, the State of Washington’s Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission made a recommendation that would reduce the 
likelihood of transfer for juveniles under age fifteen.83 The first 
rationale for this recommendation was that “scientific research 
regarding juvenile brain development has shown that juveniles are 
both less culpable than adults for their action and more amenable to 
rehabilitation than adults.”84 
In New Mexico, brain science has been integrated into 
delinquency proceedings, as one of the factors judges must consider 
 
 78. Yee: California Assembly Failed Our Kids, CAL. STATE SENATE (Aug. 30, 2010), 
http://sd08.senate.ca.gov/news/2010-08-30-yee-california-assembly-failed-our-kids  
 79. S. 9, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); see Bill List, LEGIS. COUNS. CAL., 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?bill_number=sb_9&sess=PREV&house=S&author 
=yee (last updated Nov. 21, 2012). 
 80. Governor Brown Signs SB 9!, FAIR SENTENCING FOR YOUTH,  
http://www.fairsentencingforyouth.org/2012/09/governor-brown-signs-sb-9/ (last visited Jan. 21, 
2012). 
 81. LONI HANCOCK, S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS, S. 9, 2012 Leg., Reg. 
Sess., at J (Cal. 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0001 
-0050/sb_9_cfa_20110404_112049_sen_comm.html. 
 82. Child Advocates Urge Governor to Sign SB 9—Fair Sentencing for Youth Act, CAL. ST. 
SENATE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://sd08.senate.ca.gov/news/2012-09-10-marian-wright-edelman 
-child-advocates-urge-governor-sign-sb-9-fair-sentencing-youth- (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 83. Memorandum from Jean Soliz-Conklin, Exec. Dir. of Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n 
Staff, State of Wash., to Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, State of Wash. 1 (Dec. 12, 2008), 
available at http://www.ofm.wa.gov/sgc/meetings/2008/12/SGCmeeting_20081212_ExhibitA 
.pdf. 
 84. Id. 
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is the child’s brain development.85 In Wisconsin in 2010, the 
Assembly Committee on Corrections and the Courts heard testimony 
about adolescent brain science during a hearing on juvenile 
transfer.86 In Nevada, the Legislative Committee on Child Welfare 
and Juvenile Justice heard brain science testimony during its April 
2012 meeting.87 
Of course, just because brain science is mentioned does not 
mean it will be persuasive. For instance, in Texas, while the 
Chairman of the Texas House Corrections Committee reported that 
“[t]he brain development studies have been part of the discussion and 
will continue to be,” he also emphasized that: 
the main issue we’re dealing with is providing proper 
security. . . . If you’re getting assaulted by a youth, it 
doesn’t make much difference to you whether his brain will 
not fully develop until he’s 25. We have to have a safe 
environment in these (lockups) to have any success at 
programming and rehabilitation.88 
Moreover, brain science may cut in different directions. In 
Nebraska, for instance, legislators debated whether juveniles should 
have an expanded right to contract. One legislator was concerned 
that those under age eighteen would not understand contracts well 
enough, arguing that “[t]heir brains do not allow them to process [the 
details of contracting].”89 
The Texas and Nebraska anecdotes are, at present, the exception 
that proves the rule—for the most part, brain science is being 
introduced to promote reduced sentences and to reduce transfer to 
criminal courts. An excellent illustration is found in New York. 
 
 85. CORINNE WOLFE, UNIV. OF N.M. SCH. OF LAW, NEW MEXICO JUVENILE JUSTICE 
HANDBOOK 3–2 (2011) (citing N. M. STAT. § 32A-2-20(C)(5) (2009)). 
 86. Committee Hears Testimony on Bill to Return Most 17-Year-Olds to Juvenile Justice 
System, ST. B. WIS. (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=News 
&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=91973. 
 87. LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON CHILD WELFARE & JUVENILE JUSTICE, NEV. LEGISLATURE, 
SUMMARY MINUTES AND ACTION REPORT, 76th Sess., at 24–25 (2012), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Interim/76th2011/Minutes/ChildWelfare//IM-ChildWelfare-040412 
-10548.pdf. 
 88. Mike Ward, Report on Adolescent Brains Hits Nerve in Criminal Justice Debate, 
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Aug. 6, 2012, 8:58 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state 
-regional-govt-politics/report-on-adolescent-brains-hits-nerve-in-criminal/nRNKT/. 
 89. Neb. Legislature, Senators Advance Bill That Would Add Rights for Some Youth, 
UNICAMERAL UPDATE, Jan. 25–29, 2010, at 10, available at http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov 
/pdf/update/Jan25-29_2010.pdf. 
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New York is one of two states that prosecutes sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds as adults.90 In 2011, New York State Chief 
Judge Jonathan Lippman proposed a new plan that would send most 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders to family courts instead of 
adult criminal courts.91 In making his pitch, which led to the start of 
pilot initiatives in nine New York counties,92 Judge Lippman 
explicitly referred to brain science: “[W]e know based on scientific 
research that adolescents, even older adolescents, are different than 
adults. In particular, their brains are not fully matured, and this limits 
their ability to make reasoned judgments and engage in the kind of 
thinking that weighs risks and consequences.”93 
Lippman built his case on the Supreme Court’s reference to the 
behavioral and brain science, noting that: 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
validity of the science of adolescent brain development in 
concluding that different penalties are appropriate for 
juveniles who commit serious crimes. In 2005, in Roper v 
Simmons, the Court outlawed the death penalty for crimes 
committed by persons under 18. Last year, in Graham v 
Florida, the Court outlawed life without parole for juveniles 
in non-homicide cases. The Court made clear in Roper that 
young offenders are not to be absolved of responsibility or 
punishment for their actions, but rather that they need to be 
treated differently from older criminals because their 
transgressions are not as “morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult.”94 
The state legislature considered two bills in 2012 related to 
Lippman’s proposal.95 
 
 90. North Carolina is the other state. Judith S. Kaye, A “New Beginning” for Adolescents in 
Our Criminal Justice System, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 839, 843 (2009). 
 91. Jonathan Lippman, Address to the Citizens Crime Commission (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/Lippman110921.pdf. Under the proposed ban, the most 
violent juveniles would continue to be prosecuted as adults. Mosi Secret, New York Judge Seeks 
New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21 
/nyregion/new-yorks-chief-judge-seeks-new-system-for-juvenile-defendants.html. 
 92. Adolescent Diversion Program: The Court System Pilots a New Approach to Young 
Offenders, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.courtinnovation.org 
/research/adolescent-diversion-program-court-system-pilots-new-approach-young-offenders 
[hereinafter Adolescent Diversion Program]. 
 93. See Lippman, supra note 91, at 4. 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. A.B. A9424, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012). 
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Both bills made explicit reference to brain science. The first 
(which would raise the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen and 
expand family court jurisdiction) noted that “[r]esearch has shown 
that children’s brains do not fully develop until after the age of 
eighteen, and youths who engage in criminal conduct often do not 
have the same level of understanding of their actions as adults.”96 
The related bill, which addressed similar concerns, argued that 
“[m]odern behavioral neuroscience confirms that the brains of 
teenagers are not yet mature . . . [and it] is now understood that 
teenage offenders should be treated differently from older 
criminals . . . .”97 In addition, family court judges in the pilot 
diversion programs received training that included an introduction to 
brain science.98 
Judge Lippman’s efforts have also had ripple effects on other 
levels of government. The New York City Council’s Committee of 
Juvenile Justice99 adopted a resolution in 2011 in support of raising 
the age of criminal responsibility for nonviolent offenses to 
eighteen.100 The hearing and committee notes are useful sources in 
examining the rhetoric of neuroscience in this policy discussion. 
Multiple individuals who testified before the committee referred 
to the science of adolescent development.101 The Correctional 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. S.B. 7394, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us 
/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S07394&term=2011&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Votes=Y&Memo=Y 
&Text=Y. 
 98. See Adolescent Diversion Program, supra note 92 (“Under the initiative, judges hearing 
cases involving 16 and 17 year olds receive training in topics such as adolescent brain 
development, trauma, substance abuse, mental health, co-occurring disorders, education, and 
family issues.”). 
 99. The New York City Council Committee of Juvenile Justice is a sub-committee within 
the city council. The committee holds regular meetings, rules on and drafts reports regarding 
juvenile justice resolutions to be voted upon. See Committee on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. CITY 
COUNCIL (Oct. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/DepartmentDetail.aspx?ID= 
7044&GUID=E5F9693D-1F9C-45DD-919F-74503033A755&Search=. 
 100. N.Y.C. Council Res. 1067-2011, Leg. Sess. 2805 (N.Y. 2011), available at 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&ID=1024411&GUID
=44E57E53-1EB4-48C8-9453-D4C0DF3E908C&Title=Legislation+Text  (“Resolution 
supporting New York State Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman’s call on the New York State 
Legislature to pass and the Governor to sign legislation raising the age of criminal responsibility 
for nonviolent offenses to 18 and permit the cases of 16 and 17 year-olds charged with such 
offenses to be adjudicated in the Family Court rather than the adult criminal justice system.”). 
 101. Id. In addition to the Correctional Association of New York, Steven Banks of The Legal 
Aid Society Juvenile Rights Practice mentioned brain science. Testimony Before the Comm. on 
Juvenile Justice on Res. No. 1067-2011, 2012 N.Y.C. Council (N.Y. 2011) (testimony of Steven 
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Association of New York, for instance, “strongly believes in the 
scientific research and analysis cited by [Judge Lippman] as grounds 
for his proposal.”102 The Correctional Association cited the work of 
neuroscientist Ruben Gur, as well as Roper and Graham, in building 
its case on “the significant body of rigorous scientific 
research . . . .”103 The Committee also considered a Campaign for 
Youth Justice publication that discussed why “Teen Brains Are Not 
Fully Developed.”104 
The testimony heard by the Committee seems to have influenced 
its final report, which stated that “[a] growing body of science 
research shows that the adolescent brain is not as fully developed as 
the adult brain.”105 In the Resolution itself, the Committee found that 
“scientific studies of the adolescent mind have shown that sixteen 
and seventeen year-olds lack the maturity and judgment to 
understand the legal consequences of their actions,” and thus the 
Council supported Judge Lippman’s proposal.106 
C.  Unknown Effect of Neuroscience on Policy Outcomes  
The anecdotal evidence just reviewed shows that brain science is 
a part of current juvenile justice debate in legislative circles. But it is 
not known whether discussion of juvenile justice reform is more 
frequent, more prominent, or more persuasive because of brain 
science.107 Moreover, the effect of brain science on policy outcomes 
 
Banks, Attorney-in-Chief, The Legal Aid Society), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/media 
/151080/testimony110111.pdf. 
 102. Testimony Before the N.Y.C. Council on Resolution 1067-2011, 2012 N.Y.C. Council 
(N.Y. 2011) (testimony of Gabrielle Prisco, Dir., Juvenile Justice Project, The Correctional 
Assoc. of N.Y.), available at www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/NY_GPtestimony 
_JJP_2011.doc. 
 103. Id. 
 104. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010: 
REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (2011), available at 
www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf. 
 105. COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, CITY COUNCIL OF N.Y.C., REPORT FOR VOICE-VOTE 
RES. NO. 1067, at 53 (2012), available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail 
.aspx?ID=986416&GUID=62F4A0D5-6EC7-490D-A8CD-CAC0E9DFA490 (click on the 
hyperlink titled “Committee Report 11/28/11”). 
 106. N.Y.C. Council Res. 1067-2011, Leg. Sess. 2805 (N.Y. 2011), available at http://legistar 
.council.nyc.gov/ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&ID=1024411&GUID=44E57E53-
1EB4-48C8-9453-D4C0DF3E908C&Title=Legislation+Text. 
 107.  For a critique that this emphasis is misplaced, see Cox, supra note 58. 
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also remains a mystery. What is known is that the future of juvenile 
justice is now going to be shaped in the shadow of Miller.108 
IV.  LEGISLATING BRAIN SCIENCE POST-MILLER 
The Court’s decision in Miller poses a number of problems for 
the twenty-six states that impose a mandatory life sentence for 
juvenile murderers.109 First, state courts must determine what, if 
anything, to do about the more than 2,500 individuals already serving 
juvenile life sentences.110 One especially important debate is whether 
Miller should be apply retroactively to those individuals.111 Second, 
courts in affected states must also figure out how to handle ongoing 
cases in which a juvenile has been charged with first-degree 
murder.112 Third, legislatures must figure out how to fix the now 
unconstitutional state statutes. The “fix” does not have to necessarily 
be an overhaul of the system, but “could be as simple as changing a 
few words in an existing statute.”113 
At the time of this writing, it is still too early to know exactly 
what the full effects of Miller will be. But it seems a good bet that 
whatever happens, brain science will be used by advocates in the 
promotion of their preferred reform policies. Thus, I consider in this 
part post-Miller legislative action in selected states and the normative 
framework we should employ for evaluating the use of neuroscience 
in those contexts. 
 
 
 
 108. See infra Part IV. 
 109. Maggie Clark, States Reconsider Juvenile Life Sentences, STATELINE (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/states-reconsider-juvenile-life-sentences 
-85899407729. 
 110. Paul Elias, Life Sentences for Juveniles: Should 2,500 Serving Life Without Parole Be 
Released?, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2012/08/19/life-sentences-for-juveni_n_1806259.html. Courts (or legislatures) must also 
determine what will constitute a de facto life sentence. For instance, is an 80-year sentence 
effectively a life sentence? 
 111.  Sean Craig, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road 
Towards A Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 408 n.224 (2013) (“[S]tate courts are 
split over whether Miller should means anything for prisoners still serving mandatory juvenile 
LWOP sentences. Despite the fact that the Miller Court applied its holding to Kuntrell Jackson's 
collateral challenge, state courts disagree about the decision's general retroactivity.”). 
 112. This issue arose in Florida in the case of Cristian Fernandez. See Jim Schoettler, 
Fernandez Ruling Could Have Statewide Impact, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 31, 2012, at B-5. 
 113. Clark, supra note 109. 
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A.  Legislation Post-Miller 
This section reviews selected legislation (through October 2012) 
in the wake of Miller.114 In October 2012, the Wyoming Joint 
Judiciary Interim Committee drafted a new juvenile sentencing 
bill.115 The bill would provide relief to juveniles convicted of murder 
in the first degree by punishing them not with mandatory life, but 
with “imprisonment for a term of not less than twenty-five years, or 
for life, or life imprisonment without parole.”116 The legislation 
further provided that “[b]efore imposing a sentence . . . the 
sentencing court shall hold a hearing at which the defendant and the 
state may present evidence of the defendant’s age, maturity, 
intelligence, relative culpability, potential for rehabilitation, ability to 
appreciate risks and consequences and any other matter relative to 
the sentencing decision.”117 The statute translates the Miller decision 
into new policy, providing guidance on the factors that a judge 
should consider in determining the juvenile’s sentence. 
In Iowa, Governor Terry Branstad commuted the life-without-
possibility-of-parole sentences of thirty-eight juveniles to life with 
the possibility of parole after sixty years.118 Discussing the 
commutations, Governor Branstad said that “[j]ustice is a balance 
and these commutations ensure that justice is balanced with 
 
 114.  Much has happened since the October 2012 symposium. For updates, see Cara H. 
Drinan, Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014); Anne Teigen, 2013 
Juvenile Justice State Legislation, (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/2013-juvenile-justice-state-legislation.aspx, Natl. Conf. State Legislatures. 
 115. JOINT JUDICIARY INTERIM COMM., DRAFT OF A BILL OF AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMES 
AND OFFENSES; PROVIDING FOR A SENTENCING HEARING FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER; PROVIDING FOR PAROLE ELIGIBILITY FOR JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO LIFE; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE, S. 62-202, 2013 
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012). It appears that the legislation “won’t apply to the eight inmates already 
serving life from crimes they committed as juveniles. Those inmates would still need to persuade 
a judge to reduce their sentence, according to lawyers who are familiar with the legislation.” 
Joshua Wolfson, Fate of Juvenile Life Sentences Would Rest with Judges, BILLINGS GAZETTE 
Nov. 5, 2012, http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/fate-of-juvenile-life-
sentences-would-rest-with-judges/article_36e69334-0b20-5480-9ea6-23562611efc5.html 
#ixzz2C1pquqMm. 
 116.  JOINT JUDICIARY INTERIM COMM., supra note 115. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Iowa Terry Branstad, Branstad Moves to 
Prevent the Release of Dangerous Murderers in Light of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
(July 16, 2012), https://governor.iowa.gov/2012/07/branstad-moves-to-prevent-the-release-of 
-dangerous-murderers-in-light-of-recent-u-s-supreme-court-decision/. 
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punishment for those vicious crimes and taking into account public 
safety.”119  
Finally, in Florida the post-Miller efforts to come will almost 
certainly be merged with the post-Graham efforts that have sputtered 
in the legislature. The Florida legislature responded to the Supreme 
Court’s decision with a “Graham Compliance Act,” first introduced 
in both the state house and state senate in 2010, and later introduced 
(in modified form) in subsequent years.120 Through 2011, the 
legislature had not yet enacted such legislation,121 and as of the time 
of this writing in 2012, the legislature had not acted.122 
This inaction is problematic, as Graham v. Florida requires that 
states must provide “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” for 
juveniles sentenced to life in prison.123 But the Court did not fully 
define what it meant by this requirement, and thus the “legal and 
practical question remains—what amounts to a ‘meaningful 
opportunity for release’?”124 While courts will answer this question 
through re-sentencing individual inmates, legislatures, too, will play 
a role in Graham compliance when state sentencing laws are deemed 
inconsistent with the Graham mandate.125 
 
 119. Id. Since the original writing of this Article, Branstad’s commutations have not all been 
upheld as constitutional. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013). 
 120. H.B. 29, 2011 H.R., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); S.B. 160, 2011 S., 113th Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2011). Similar bills were re-introduced in subsequent years. See S.B. 212, 2012 S., 114th 
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 5, 2012 H.R., 114th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012). 
 121. Ilona P. Vila, Supporting the Florida Legal Community’s Response to Graham v. 
Florida, 17 BARRY L. REV. 153, 155 (2011) (“In 2010 and 2011, neither the Florida Governor's 
Office nor the Florida Legislature took action in response to the Graham opinion, leaving the 
courts to resentence each Graham individual entitled to relief.”). 
 122. Whether this failure to act on the proposed legislation is a good thing depends on one’s 
view of the legislation. For instance, requiring at least twenty-five years behind bars before parole 
consideration struck at least some as problematic. By being in prison for at least twenty-five 
years, a juvenile offender “could arguably attain cognitive, social, and educational maturity long 
before expiration of twenty-five years.” Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release 
Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 39 (2011). 
 123. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). Responding to Graham might involve 
significant system redesign, as “[t]o truly implement Graham, legislatures need to revise the 
considerations parole commissions use to mandate review to make the considerations based on 
maturity and rehabilitation, as mandated by the Supreme Court.” Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, 
What States Should Do to Provide a Meaningful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize 
Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 310, 328 (2012). Gerard Glynn and Ilona 
Vila have suggested a model statute that legislatures could adopt to meet the Graham mandate. 
 124. Green, supra note 122, at 1. 
 125. Leanne Palmer, Juvenile Sentencing in the Wake of Graham v. Florida: A Look into 
Uncharted Territory, 17 BARRY L. REV. 133, 148 (explaining that legislatures must act as well 
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Turning to Pennsylvania, Miller was decided as Pennsylvania 
state legislators were already working on a juvenile justice reform 
bill to continue addressing concerns stemming from a highly 
publicized “Kids for Cash” scandal that was uncovered in Luzerne 
County by the Juvenile Law Center.126 The Kids for Cash program 
involved a Luzerne County judge who was found guilty of taking 
more than $1 million in bribes in exchange for sending children in 
the juvenile system to for-profit juvenile detention centers.127 
Faced with the Miller dilemma discussed above, Pennsylvania’s 
legislators amended the bill to change mandatory sentencing 
requirements for juveniles.128 The new bill amended Pennsylvania’s 
statutes such that those convicted of first-degree murder,129 who were 
older than fifteen but younger than eighteen at the time of the 
offense, would receive life in prison without parole or a minimum 
thirty-five-year sentence,130 and those younger than fifteen at the 
time of the crime would receive life without parole or at least twenty-
five years.131 Those convicted of second-degree murder who were 
older than fifteen but younger than eighteen at the time of the offense 
would receive a minimum thirty-year sentence, and those younger 
than fifteen at the time of the crime would receive at least twenty 
years. Miller held that state sentencing schemes could not mandate 
 
“because many laws, such as Florida’s law abolishing parole, can be contradictory to Graham’s 
holding”). 
 126. Luzerne Kids-for-Cash Scandal, JUV. L. CENTER, http://www.jlc.org/current-initiatives 
/promoting-fairness-courts/luzerne-kids-cash-scandal (last updated Feb. 2012); WILLIAM 
ECENBARGER, KIDS FOR CASH (2012). 
 127. Sarah Cassi, Review of Luzerne County ‘Kids for Cash’ Scandal Complete, Thousands of 
Convictions Dismissed, EXPRESS-TIMES (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com 
/breaking-news/index.ssf/2012/01/kids_for_cash_scandal_judicial.html. 
 128. Greenleaf’s Bills Signed into Law on Criminal Justice Reform, Auto Theft Prevention, 
and Juvenile Justice, PENN. SENATE REPUBLICANS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://pasenategop.com 
/news/2012/1012/greenleaf-102512.htm (“The legislation was amended in the House to comply 
with the recent U.S. Supreme Court Ruling that mandatory sentencing of juveniles to life without 
parole is unconstitutional.”). The legislation does not apply retroactively. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court will decide how to handle the cases of those juveniles who were sentenced 
(previous to Miller) to mandatory life without parole for murder. See Dana DiFilippo, Pa.’s High 
Court Grapples with Federal Decision on Sentencing Juveniles, PHILLY.COM (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://articles.philly.com/2012-09-13/news/33818431_1_mandatory-life-without-parole-sentences 
-juvenile-lifers-lengthy-sentences. 
 129. This includes “first degree murder of an unborn child or of murder of a law enforcement 
officer of the first degree.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(a) (2012). 
 130. Sentence of persons under the age of eighteen for murder, murder of an unborn child and 
murder of a law enforcement officer. Id. § 1102.1(a)(1). 
 131. Id. § 11.021(a)(2). 
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life without parole for homicide offenders; the Court did not go so 
far as to prohibit such sentences altogether. The Pennsylvania 
legislation thus solves the problem by keeping life as an option, but 
providing an alternative as well. 
 The bill was praised by some and criticized by others. The 
Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, for instance, applauded 
the passage of the bill.132 The bill also found support from the 
Editorial Board of the Altoona Mirror newspaper.133 But the bill 
generated strong resistance from advocacy groups and grassroots 
organizations. Human Rights Watch wrote to Governor Corbett 
arguing that the bill was “contrary to the spirit of [Miller] and would 
codify excessive sentences for children that are inconsistent with 
international human rights law to which all US states are bound.”134 
Similarly, the grassroots campaign Decarcerate PA argued that 
the bill did “not honor the spirit of the US Supreme Court decision” 
and was “rushed through the General Assembly without sufficient 
time for debate and consideration or public input.”135 They organized 
a letter-writing and phone campaign to voice opposition to elected 
leaders.136 
Salient to this Article’s discussion of brain science, the 
executive director of the Pennsylvania Prison Society argued that the 
bill “fail[ed] to take into account relevant findings from neuroscience 
research” and that “[i]n crafting our laws, legislators should be 
considering recent findings about the development of the human 
brain and how it does not reach full functioning until the mid-20s.”137 
The Juvenile Law Center also argued that the bill was not “consistent 
 
 132. Press Release, Pa. Dist. Att’ys Ass’n, District Attorneys Praise PA Legislature for End of 
Session Criminal Justice Focus (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.pdaa.org/index.php?option=com 
_content&view=article&id=154:district-attorneys-praise-pa-legislature-for-end-of-session 
-criminal-justice-focus&catid=48:press-pdaa&Itemid=64. 
 133. Editorial, Bill Finds a Proper Balance, ALTOONA MIRROR (Oct. 24, 2012), 
http://www.altoonamirror.com/page/content.detail/id/565393/Bill-finds-a-proper-balance.html 
?nav=728. 
 134. Letter from Antonio Ginatta, U.S. Program Advocacy Dir., Human Rights Watch, to 
Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa. (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/19 
/uspennsylvania-dont-codify-excessive-sentences-children. 
 135. Urgent: Voice Your Opposition to SB 850 Now!, DECARCERATE PA, http://decarceratepa 
.info/calendar/urgent-voice-your-opposition-sb-850-now (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 136. Id. 
 137. William DiMascio, Reconsider Treating the Violent with Violence, CENTRE DAILY 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.centredaily.com/2012/10/17/3372215/william-dimascio 
-reconsider-treating.html. 
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with the latest knowledge of adolescent development” and that “the 
line-drawing proposed by SB 850 is arbitrary, lacking any scientific 
foundation.”138 Despite this and other opposition, the revised bill was 
passed by the House on October 16, 2012, passed through a Senate 
Concurrence Vote the following day, and signed into law by 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett on October 25, 2012.139 
 
B. Evaluating the Use of Brain Science 
 
 We know that state legislatures are playing an important role 
alongside courts in shaping juvenile justice policy post-Miller, and 
we know that often those legislative debates include reference to 
brain science.140 The question I consider here is: by what normative 
criteria should we evaluate this use—and legislative use more 
generally—of brain science.141 
 As noted earlier, the neurolaw literature does not provide us 
with much guidance on the use of brain science in legislatures. There 
are, to be sure, some notable exceptions. Political scientist Robert 
Blank wrote a book in 1999 arguing that brain policy “warrants 
urgent attention by policy makers, policy analysts, and informed 
citizens,” and that “the political debate surrounding this emerging 
knowledge about the brain and new intervention techniques promises 
to be intense.”142 He followed up in 2013 with a book on neuro-
interventions, but neither book has found its way into the mainstream 
of neurolaw conversation.143 For the most part, the recent volumes on 
 
 138. Pennsylvania Misses the Mark on Life Without Parole for Juveniles, JUV. L. CENTER 
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.jlc.org/blog/pennsylvania-misses-mark-life-without-parole-juveniles. 
 139. SB 850—Repeals Mandatory Life Sentences for Certain Juvenile Offenders—Key Vote, 
PROJECT VOTE SMART, http://votesmart.org/bill/15854/41813/repeals-mandatory-life-sentences 
-for-certain-juvenile-offenders#.UJWcI4aRaSo (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
    140. As legal scholars Richard Bonnie and Elizabeth Scott have observed, “[a]cross the 
country, neuroscience research indicating that teenage brains differ from those of adults has been 
offered in support of a broad range of policies dealing more leniently with young offenders.” 
Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the 
Law, 22 CURRENT DEV. IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 158, 160 (April 2013). 
    141.  I consider this question at greater length, and through analysis of an original dataset on 
legislation making reference to brain science, in Francis X. Shen, Synapses and Social Policy: 
The Legislative Politics of Neurolaw (Feb. 23, 2014) (on file with author). 
    142.  ROBERT H. BLANK, BRAIN POLICY: HOW THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE WILL CHANGE OUR 
LIVES AND OUR POLITICS 168, 172 (1999). 
    143. ROBERT H. BLANK, INTERVENTION IN THE BRAIN: POLITICS, POLICY, AND ETHICS 
(2013). Blank’s 1999 book is cited only three times in Westlaw’s secondary sources. One 
instance is his citation in Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating 
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neurolaw have focused primarily on the potential courtroom 
contributions of neuroscience.144 
       More generally, while there has been a decent amount written 
about the use of science in trial courts, constitutional issues, and 
administrative law,145 Faigman observed in 1999 that “[t]here have 
been no general studies or assessments of the legislative use of 
science.”146 There is clearly a gap to fill and a need to think critically 
about science-policy interaction in the state legislative domain. 
 Here I reflect on one question that ought to be a part of such an 
inquiry: With what normative framework should we encourage or 
discourage uses of neuroscience in legislatures? Drawing on the 
distinction I made earlier between “lab science” as compared to 
“lobbyist science” and “legislator science”, I suggest that a useful 
way to frame the issue is to think of a two-dimensional grid that 
examines both (1) adherence to the core findings of the relevant 
science, and (2) effectiveness in advancing pre-existing normative 
policy goals. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptualization, though of 
course both dimensions are continuous and not categorical. 
 
 
 
 
 
the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 397 (2010), and the other two 
citations are simply footnotes mentioning his work. There is no extended treatment of either his 
1999 or his 2013 studies in the legal literature. 
    144.  See, e.g., JOSEPH R. SIMPSON, NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE 
CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM (2012). 
    145.  In the administrative law realm, the bulk of scholarship has focused on environmental 
science. See, e.g., Joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional 
Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983); Wendy E. Wagner, The 
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).  
    146.  DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY 210 n.29 (1999). Faigman includes a chapter on 
legislatures but focuses primarily on funding decisions by the U.S. Congress, as well as the 
debate in the 1970s (involving Congress and the FDA) over saccharin. Since 1999, only a few 
scholars have started to fill this gap, with most still overlooking legislative use of science. A 
notable contribution is political scientist Ann Keller’s analysis of science in the context of federal 
environmental policy. ANN CAMPBELL KELLER, SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2009). 
Other studies, both before and after Keller’s, on science in the legislative process include: Denise 
Scheberle, Radon and Asbestos: A Study of Agenda Setting and Causal Stories, 22 POL’Y STUD. 
J. 74 (1994); SHELDON KRIMSKY, HORMONAL CHAOS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ORIGINS OF 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ENDOCRINE HYPOTHESIS (2000); Stephen Zehr, Comparative Boundary 
Work: U.S. Acid Rain and Global Climate Change Policy Deliberations, 32 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 
445 (2005). 
LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE 9/9/2014  11:46 AM 
Spring 2013] LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE 1013 
Figure 1. Tradeoff Between Adherence to Lab Science Findings 
vs. Effectiveness in Advancing Policy Goals 
 
 Effectiveness in  
Advancing Policy Goals 
Adherence 
of 
Legislator 
Science to 
Lab 
Science 
(I) High Adherence  
+ Low Effectiveness 
 (II) High Adherence  
+ High Effectiveness 
   
(III) Low Adherence  
+ Low Effectiveness 
 
(IV) Low Adherence  
+ High Effectiveness 
   
       Examining the 2x2 matrix in Figure 1, neither policy advocates 
nor science purists would want the outcome in quadrant III (science 
that departs from the knowledge base, failing to produce the desired 
policy). Similarly, both policy advocates and those who desire close 
adherence to laboratory science should agree that quadrant II is a 
good outcome (there are few distortions to the science and it 
produces the desired policy.) 
       The challenge arises when we consider quadrants I and IV, and 
the relationship between them.147 For purposes of discussion here, 
let’s assume that a sufficiently strong departure from laboratory 
science produces sufficiently good policy outcomes such that an 
advocate moves from quadrant I into quadrant IV. Do we applaud or 
criticize such a move? 
       Applause would likely be in order if fixing the justice system 
were as simple as enacting a single piece of legislation, and if the 
brain science (in its modified, legislator-neuroscience form) helped 
 
    147.  A relevant empirical question—beyond the scope of this Article—is whether moving 
from High to Low Adherence (i.e., the transformation of lab neuroscience to lobbyist and 
legislator neuroscience) is necessary to be effective. For instance, neuroscientists Alexandra 
Cohen and B.J. Casey’s review of relevant science “suggest[s] that, in the heat of the moment, as 
in the presence of peers, potential threat, or rewards, emotional centers of the brain hijack less 
mature prefrontal control circuits during adolescence, leading to poor choice behaviors.” 
Alexandra O. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of Developmental 
Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 63, 65 (2013). As a 
result, they conclude that “juvenile justice policies should aim to promote rehabilitation, reduce 
recidivism, and implement interventions that will bolster healthy development.” Id. Scientific 
summaries such as this (which acknowledge limitations such as “neuroimaging techniques are not 
currently able to aid in arguing for the guilt or innocence of a defendant in the courtroom”) might 
prove useful without additional reformulation. Id.  
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achieve that goal. But the world is not so simple, and neither is the 
use of brain science in policymaking. 
 To start, overlooking the complexities of the neuroscience leaves 
one vulnerable to counterattack in future policymaking using the 
same body of science. For instance, many scholars have recognized 
that there is a “double-edged sword” relationship between sentencing 
and neuroscientific evidence. As scholars Brent Garland and Mark 
Frankel observed in 2006: 
while a defendant could argue for mitigation due to some 
genetic propensity or neurological defect (“bad genes” or a 
“bad brain” led him astray), the prosecution could make a 
counterargument for aggravation, saying that the defendant 
is even more dangerous because he is biologically 
predisposed to commit crime and thus should be 
incarcerated rather than given probation.148 
Garland and Frankel argued that “[t]his mirror side to mitigation 
arguments should also be included in the policy dialogue,”149 and I 
concur. In the context of juvenile justice, the double-edged sword is 
potentially an issue because, while children are different from adults, 
they are also different from each other. At the start of the Miller 
opinion, Justice Kagan emphasizes the Court’s line of cases requiring 
“individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious 
penalties.”150 
At present, neuroscience can offer little in the way of 
individualized assessment.151 But efforts are underway in 
 
 148. Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About 
Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2006, at 
101, 106 (2006). The point has also been made by others. See Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged 
Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501 
(2007); Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the 
Criminal from the Crime, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2006, at 101, 115; O. Carter 
Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 
(2007). 
 149.  Garland & Frankel, supra note 148, at 106. 
 150. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
 151. Baird et al., supra note 35, at 121 (“[B]arring gross neurological pathology, these 
[neuro]scientific advances have little or nothing to offer the individual offender.”). Bonnie & 
Scott, supra note 140, at 161.  
At some point, neuroscience and accompanying behavioral studies may provide age 
norms against which an individual adolescent’s brain development and functioning can 
be measured. However, today an expert who offers an opinion that a particular 14-
year-old defendant has a mature or immature brain as compared with other 14-year-
olds (or “has the maturity of a 17-year-old is exceeding the limits of science. Currently, 
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neuroscience to learn more about individual differences. For 
instance, the “neuroscience of psychopathy is a field undergoing 
rapid growth,” and perhaps that growth will one day give the legal 
system more reliable ways to reliably detect psychopathy early in the 
life course.152 Some scientists have already argued that “juvenile 
psychopathy is fairly stable across adolescence,”153 and that the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is 
overcautious in warning against diagnosing personality disorders in 
youth.154 These authors make clear that they “do not believe that 
these results support necessarily the use of juvenile psychopathy 
scores in forensic decision-making, particularly in late childhood,”155 
but nevertheless one can see how—should there be sufficient 
advances in the science—such data may one day be used by 
advocates in a forensic setting. 
It does not strain common sense to think that at least a few of the 
sixteen-year-olds in the country who commit a violent, premeditated 
crime are rotten to the core, and for whatever reasons have little 
chance for reform. Could neuroscience ever help us identify these 
individuals (and feel comfortable with the reliability of that 
identification)? Maybe not.156 But if so, such developments in “lab 
neuroscience” would pose a problem for current “lobbyist 
neuroscience” to the extent that lobbyists argue that neuroscience 
tells us only that adolescents as a group are less deserving of 
punishment, and does not tell us whether individual adolescents can 
be singled out for adult-level penalties.  
In addition, if a premium is placed primarily on effectiveness, 
and advocates are encouraged to modify the science narrative as they 
see fit, it makes it difficult to criticize those advocates on the other 
 
the only legitimate use of adolescent brain research in individual cases is to provide 
decision makers with general descriptions of brain maturation.” 
 152. Nathaniel E. Anderson & Kent A. Kiehl, The Psychopath Magnetized: Insights from 
Brain Imaging, 16 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 52, 58 (2012). 
 153. Donald R. Lynam et al., The Stability of Psychopathy Across Adolescence, 21 DEV. 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1133, 1148 (2009). 
 154. Id. at 1148 (“The stability of psychopathic traits across childhood and adolescence are 
much higher than what is implied by the characterization provided within the DSM-IV-TR.”). 
 155. Id. 
 156.  Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions 
About Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NAT. REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 513, 518 (2013) 
(“Although there are studies that have compared juvenile offenders’ brain structure or function 
with that of non-offenders, using neuroscience to predict individuals’ future behavior is a 
different (and more difficult) matter.”) 
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side of the debate. For instance, Patricia Soung has cautioned “that 
reliance on neuroscience to explain adolescent cognition and 
behavior is subject to misinterpretation, misuse and even abuse.”157 
Specifically, Soung voices a concern about the introduction of 
neuroscience-based arguments in a racialized criminal justice system. 
One’s response to such misuse of the science might be, “The science 
doesn’t say that!” But such a position becomes more difficult to hold 
when an opponent can say something similar in reply. 
 
C. Looking Ahead 
 
Brain science can add productively to many legislative debates, 
certainly including juvenile justice. But legislating neuroscience 
should not replace legislating values. As Terry Maroney has argued, 
“the real task . . . for those seeking juvenile justice reform is to 
influence such beliefs, values, and inclinations directly, rather than 
expect such influence to flow naturally from explanation of 
neuroscience.”158 
Developmental psychologist Laurence Steinberg, whose 
scholarship has been cited by the Supreme Court, offers this 
cautionary note: “[w]hether the revelation that the adolescent brain 
may be less mature than scientists had previously thought is 
ultimately a good thing, a bad thing, or a mixed blessing for young 
people remains to be seen.”159 If one lives by the neuroscience sword 
in making the case that children are different, then one may die by 
the neuroscience sword if it swings in an unanticipated way.160 
One way to avoid such unanticipated consequences is to ensure 
that neuroscience is one—but not the only and not the primary—
piece of evidence considered in the policy process. Again quoting 
Steinberg: “Brain science should inform the nation’s policy 
 
    157.   Soung, supra note 66, at 438. 
 158. See Maroney, The False Promise, supra note 35, at 172. 
 159. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public 
Policy?, 28 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 67, 78 (2012). 
 160. Buss similarly concludes “that a sophisticated understanding of child development does 
not, in itself, answer any legal questions. The law must determine not only what information it 
relies upon, but also to what use that information should be put.” Buss, supra note 49, at 515. 
LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE 9/9/2014  11:46 AM 
Spring 2013] LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE 1017 
discussions when it is relevant, but society should not make policy 
decisions on the basis of brain science alone.” 161   
Even a neuroskeptic such as Stephen Morse is “modestly 
optimistic about the near and intermediate term contributions 
neuroscience can potentially make to our ordinary, traditional, folk-
psychological legal system.”162 If this is true—that the future will 
bring us a more relevant neuroscience, but that it is not ready yet—
then the question becomes: how do we know when we get there? 
More precisely, when is a particular body of neuroscientific 
research sufficiently developed to inform a particular type of legal 
decision? Answering this question is at the very heart of neurolaw 
and central to the relationship, present and future, of neuroscience, 
law, and juvenile justice. 
The problem emerges, in part, from the probabilistic nature of 
neuroscientific data.163 Neuroscience is never going to give us a 
definitive answer to questions such as: does a particular 17-year old 
know right from wrong in the same way a particular twenty-year-old 
does? But neuroscience, as with other types of evidence, might 
provide information that allows us to make a better guess. Whether 
the neuroscience data can do that—help us to improve our 
probabilistic estimates about guilt, innocence, mental states, veracity, 
and so forth—depends on how much uncertainty is included in the 
neuroscience data. How much signal versus how much noise? 
 
 161. Steinberg, supra note 159, at 67, 68. See also Terry Maroney’s argument that whether it 
is legislatures or courts, “adolescent brain science never should be the primary argument for 
juvenile justice reform.” Maroney, supra note 34, at 258, 280. June Carbone has similarly written 
that, “[w]ith attitudes toward punishment rooted in religious worldviews and corresponding to 
deep divisions between left and right, scientific studies, however rigorous or persuasive are 
unlikely to bridge the chasm.” June Carbone, Neuroscience and Ideology: Why Science Can 
Never Supply a Complete Answer for Adolescent Immaturity, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: 
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 9, 231, 251. Carbone’s suggestion is that the information be 
included in the dialogue, but should be accompanied by a discussion of the limitations of the 
science. Id. 
 162. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance, supra note 22, at 857.  
More specifically, there are four types of situations in which neuroscience may be of 
assistance: (1) data indicating that the folk-psychological assumption underlying a 
legal rule is incorrect; (2) data suggesting the need for new or reformed legal doctrine; 
(3) evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case; and (4) data that help efficient 
adjudication or administration of criminal justice.  
Id. at 857. 
 163. This is not a problem unique to neuroscience data, but it is certainly a pronounced 
problem. 
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Courts have developed methods for determining when a 
particular type of expert testimony is allowed in court, and 
courtroom assessments focus on relevance, reliability, error rates, 
and general acceptance.164 But without such barriers in the legislative 
context, we are more likely to see legislator neuroscience diverge 
more starkly from lab neuroscience. If the legislator is using the 
science to promote a policy that accords with one’s preexisting 
normative commitments, it is likely that the use of this science is 
seen as commendable. But we ought to remain cautious about 
allowing lobbyist and legislator neuroscience to stray too far from 
the lab—even if the ultimate goal is one we agree with.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that, in addition to the use of adolescent 
brain science in court, we ought to closely examine the use of such 
science in state legislatures. Such examination reveals distinctions 
between lab neuroscience, lobbyist neuroscience, and legislator 
neuroscience. As neuroscience narratives are constructed in the 
policy stream, normative questions arise. To what extent should 
lobbyists and legislators adhere to the complexities and caveats of 
laboratory science? How much should lawmakers simplify and 
reformulate the scientific findings to achieve desired policy ends? 
The Article cautions that legislator and lobbyist neuroscience that 
diverges greatly from actual research findings may be problematic.  
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